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DEBTORS' EXEMPTION STATUTES -REVISION IDEAS
MARJORIE DICK ROMBAUER*
Agricultural laborers ... shall be secure in every part of Our Empire,
so that no one can be found so audacious as to presume to seize, take
or carry away either their persons, their oxen, their tools, or anything
else used for the tillage of the soil.
-Constitution of Frederick Code of Justinian, 529 A.D.'
While the Washington statute which enumerates personal property
which is exempt from seizure on execution or attachment is not as
ancient as the Code of Justinian,2 the oxen are still with us-a source
of amusement for law students encountering the oxen and horse and
buggy exemptions for the first time, a source of consternation for
attorneys who encounter them in their practice, and a source of no
comfort for those whom the statute was intended to protect. The wage
exemption statute3 has a similar ring of frontier days. Although it was
last amended in 1927, its history is one of retrogression rather than of
advancement, in economic terms.
This article delineates the purposes which exemption laws should
serve and surveys ways in which a comprehensive revision of the Wash-
ington statutes can more equitably (both as to debtors and creditors)
effectuate these purposes.' The discussion is far from exhaustive of the
many provisions which might be considered in a revision of the debtor
exemption area. It is intended only as a starting point for the thinking
of attorneys.'
* Instructor, School of Law, University of Washington.
1 14 ScoTT, THE CIVIL LAW 263-64 (1932).
2 RCW 6.16.020 was originally adopted in substantially its present form in 1869 and
was last amended in 1886.
3 RCW 7.32.280.
4 That present Washington exemption statutes are so antiquated as to serve little
purpose seems too obvious to require discussion. See the brief but pointed attack on
Washington's personal property exemptions by Judge Black in In re Rash, 81 F. Supp.
389, 394 (W. D. Wash. 1948).
5 Two articles of particular interest to anyone who wishes to pursue the subject
further are Joslin, Debtors' E.xemption Laws: Time for Modernization, 34 IND. L. J.
355 (1959), and Abrahams & Feldman, The Exemption of Wages from Garnishment:
Some Comparisons and Comments, 3 DE PAUL L. REV. 153 (1954). One premise of
Joslin's article, however, has no significance in Washington. He suggests that flexible
exemptions militate against a debtor's obtaining unsecured credit because of the
creditor's inability to predict what assets would be available for collection purposes.
Id. at 358-60. Assuming that the present Washington policy of permitting mortgaging
of exempt assets and assignment of exempt wages is continued, such predictability would
be lacking regardless of the manner of identifying exempt property.
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ORIGINS AND PTURPOSES
Common law paid no heed to the straits of debtors or of their families.
Such exemptions from the reach of creditors as did exist were based
upon purely practical considerations. A man's clothing could not be
seized from his person, for this would lead to breaches of the peace.'
As against the ordinary distress for rent, there was an exemption of
tools, utensils, and animals by means of which a debtor earned his
living.7 The reason: To seize these objects would deprive the debtor
of the only means by which he could earn money to pay the debt. Not
until 1845 did England adopt a statute "to protect the actual neces-
saries" of debtors from being seized on execution.'
The Roman civil law much earlier followed a similar course from
practical considerations to "necessaries" in its exemption policy. In
312 A.D., officers appointed by a judge for collection of debts were
forbidden to seize "slaves, oxen, or implements used for the cultivation
of the soil.., by which act the payment of taxes may be delayed." 9
Ultimately, in the fourteenth century, creditors were prohibited from
seizing the wearing apparel, beds, and doors of houses belonging to
debtors." These were considered the bare necessities of a family's
existence.
By the eighteenth century there had appeared in the Spanish civil
code (drawn in part from the Roman law) an extensive list of exemp-
tions available to all debtors." The Spanish code exemptions became
the basis for all state exemptions. However, the states and territories
soon shifted the emphasis back to family protection," an emphasis
a Sunbolf v. Alford, 3 M & W 248, 150 Eng. Rep. 1135 (Exch. 1838).
7 Hutchins v. Chambers, 1 Burrows 588, 97 Eng. Rep. 458 (K.B. 1758).
8 Small Debts Act, 1845, 8 & 9 Vict., c. 127, § 8. This exemption extended only to
wearing apparel, bedding, and tools and implements of trade, the whole not to exceed £5.
9 Order of the Emperor Constantine to all the Inhabitants of the Provinces, 14
SCOTT, THE Civi. LAW 263 (1932).
3o HERMAN, EXECUTIONS 6 (1880). See generally HUNTER, A SHORT HISTORY OF
ROMAN LAW 1043 (3d ed. 1885).
"1 "There are some kinds of property which cannot be taken in execution, and these
are, 1st, Things sacred and destined for divine worship ... 2d, Implements and beasts
of husbandry, and the bread which laborers shall bake by their own labors, except for
royal duties (derechos), or for tithes, and ecclesiastical and seignorial rents . . . 3d,
The tools which artificers possess for the exercise of their trade or calling ... 4th. The
houses, arms, and horses of knights (cabelleros), and noblemen (hijosdalgo), except
for debt to the crown ... 5th, Mares destined for the breed of horses of a particular
breed (cabellos de casta) ... 6th, The books of advocates and students . . . 7th, The
pay of military persons . . . 8th, Beds, wearing apparel, and other things necessary
for daily use . . . ." 1 WHITE, LAND LAWS OF CALIFORNIA, OREGON, TEXAS, ETC.
323-24 (1839) ; Translation of Aso and Manuel's Institutes of the Civil Law of Spain,
first published in 1771; VANCE, BACKGROUND OF HISPANIC-AMERICAN LAW 85, n.96
(1943).1 2 E.g., "Whereas it does not comport with justice or expediency to deprive innocent
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which is still reflected in the Washington statutes today. As late as
1875 it was said that the sole purpose of the state statutes was protect-
ing families from want and misfortune," a statement borne out by the
fact that at that time only Pennsylvania and Texas exempted any per-
sonal property for single persons other than occupational tools and
accoutrements."
Notwithstanding this background, statements that exemption statutes
are intended, inter alia, for the benefit of the debtor are common, and
a three-pronged purpose is attributed to the exemptions-protection of
debtor, family, and society." Assuredly our society has an interest in
safeguarding a minimum standard of comfort for families and single
debtors. Additionally, to the extent that a debtor provides for his family
or himself, welfare and charitable funds may be relieved of that burden.
But, to emphasize the guarding of the "improvident... against penury
and want"'6 is to invoke the defensive subconscious attitude of many
that "debtors should pay their bills." Worse, the three-pronged ap-
proach ignores one of the important results of the occupational personal
property exemptions-the guarding of the productive ability of a debtor
for the benefit of all his creditors.
It is probable that a factor in growth of the attitude that exemptions
are intended as a shield for debtors was their conversion to bankruptcy
exemptions under the 1898 Bankruptcy Act." In shifting the purpose
from protection of the family and of creditors to rehabilitation of a
bankrupt, there has been imported a seeming counter purpose which
undoubtedly has been a strong inhibiting factor in revision of the
exemption area generally.' To consider the unsatisfactory results from
use of state exemptions as bankruptcy exemptions is not a purpose of
this article.' However, the dual function should be considered in any
revision of the personal property exemptions. Perhaps the most effec-
tive way to cope with this dual function is to build personal property
exemptions to serve the basic purposes of debtor exemptions-protec-
and helpless women and children of a means of subsistence . . . ." Preamble to Relief
Act of 1822, Compilation of the Laws of the State of Georgia 313 (Dawson 1831).
13 HERMAN, EXECUTIONS 105 (1880).
14 Ibid. Note that Texas retained the Spanish civil code exemptions verbatim until
1839, Cobbs v. Coleman, 14 Tex. 599 (1855), and has since maintained a similarly
liberal exemption policy.
"5 E.g., Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash. 179, 182, 86 Pac. 392, 394 (1906).
16 Ibid.
1' 11 U.S.C. § 6 (1952). The state exemptions were similarly incorporated with
limitations under the Bankruptcy Act of 1867, 14 Stat. 522-23.
Is As to the antiquity of personal property exemptions in the states generally, see
Joslin, supra note 5.
19 The subject is exhaustively considered in Comment, 68 YALE L.J. 1459 (1959),
reprinted, 33 J. BANKRUPTCY REFEREES 111 (1959).
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tion of family and creditors-and then to temper them if, as bankruptcy
exemptions, they too greatly defeat the interests of existing creditors.
Unlike personal property exemptions, wage exemptions seem to have
been a product of the industrialization of the United States, born of the
realization that an increasing number of householders were entirely
dependent on moneys earned from their labors for others, owning no
tools or implements of their own.2" It has been suggested that the incen-
tive for wage exemptions was the social interest in not having a debtor
pushed below the line of subsistence living." An element of creditor
protection may be suggested: if all the earnings of a debtor are taken
by a single creditor, the debtor will maintain himself by borrowing-
creating new debts-or using funds intended for other creditors-
producing collection problems for them.2 Early limitation of the
exemption to persons having dependents indicates that family protection
was a strong factor in adoption of wage exemptions.2 Today, however,
only twenty-one states do not make provision for single persons.2 4
Exemptions of savings or share accounts of building (or savings) and
loan associations is a relative newcomer in the exemption field, the
earliest one appearing to be that of New York, adopted in 1851.25 The
New York act provided for exemption of shares of enumerated associa-
tions to the amount of $600. A variation appeared in the Michigan
laws in 1887: a $1,000 share account exemption for members who did
not own a homestead." Addition of the proviso with regard to non-
ownership of homestead suggests an intent to provide an in lieu of home-
stead exemption. Two facts suggest, however, that such exemptions
have been prompted, rather, by a desire to promote the growth of a new
20 2 FREEMAN, EXECUTIONS 1243-44 (3d ed. 1900).
21 Note, 5 MASS. L.Q. 472, 485 (1920).22 The author has been confronted at every turn by an assumption that inadequate
wage exemptions are a determinative factor in bankruptcy filings. Limited statistical
studies have neither proved nor disproved this assumption. But see Nugent, Devices
for Liquidating Small Claims in Detroit, 2 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 259, 263 (1935),
suggesting that pressure for revision of Michigan collection methods in the early 1930's
came in part from creditors who had compunctions about garnishing but who found
themselves being cut out by others who had no such compunctions, and Sturges &
Cooper, Credit Administration and Wage Earner Bankruptcies, 42 YALE L.J. 487,
502-10 (1932).
23 See Annot., 91 Am. Dec. 411 (1887).
24 Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Nebraska, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, South
Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
25 N.Y. Sess. Laws 1851, ch. 122, § 19, presently codified as N.Y. BANKING LAW §
407.
26 Public Laws of Mich. 1887, Act 50, § 16, presently codified as MIcH. Comp. LAWS
§ 623.45 (1948). Two other states presently have the same provision, IDAO CODE ANN.
§ 11-205 (8) (1947) ($1,000, originally adopted in 1895) and Wis. STAT. ANN. §
272.18 (1958) ($1,000).
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type of financial institution: the fact that such exemptions have been
adopted as part of an act providing for incorporation and regulation of
building (or savings) and loan associations and the fact that the
original New York act attached no such limitation.27
If a cash exemption is believed to serve the purpose of debtor exemp-
tion statutes generally, then there is justification for savings account
exemptions. But is there justification for continuation of what may
appear to be a competitive or collection advantage-- 25 as against mutual,
commercial and credit union savings-for what is now a well established
financial institution?
HISTORY OF WASHINGTON STATUTES
Personal property exemptions were first enumerated in a Washington
statute in 1854.29 In 1869 a statute in substantially the present form
was adopted. ° The last amendment came in 1886 when value limits
were raised to their present level. 3
In 1897 there was an attempt to liberalize the exemption statute by
adoption of a selective personal property exemption to the value of
$1,000 for every householder. 2 Tacked to this liberalization was a
nullification of all exemptions against executions for wages of clerks,
laborers, and mechanics and certain attorney liabilities. The only por-
tion of this ill-fated act which survives to the present day is the
definition of "householder" contained in section 2." The portion creat-
ing the $1,000 selective exemption was held not to have been adopted in
accordance with constitutional requirements. 4 The portion favoring
judgments for wages and attorney's liabilities was ultimately declared
unconstitutional as creating an unjustified discrimination between
classes of general creditors.2
27 Nor have other states attached the limitation. E.g., CAL. CIv. PR0C. § 690.21
($1,000), VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 1512 (1958) ($1,000), and RCW 33.20.140 ($250).
28RCW 33.20.140, for example, provides for the exemption of a $250 account except
as to any indebtedness due to the savings and loan association with which the account
is maintained.
29 Wash. Sess. Laws 1854, § 253, at 178.
30 Wash. Sess. Laws 1869, § 343, at 87. In 1877 the $300 exemption for loggers, the
present subsection 13, was added. Wash. Sess. Laws 1877, § 351, at 73. The statute was
again amended in 1879 to provide an alternative choice (for farmers) of mules instead
of a span of horses. Wash. Sess. Laws 1879 § 1, at 157. One cannot help but wish
that the legislature had been equally responsive in later years in permitting an alterna-
tive choice of a truck or tractor when horses and mules became exceptions.
31 RCW 6.16.020.
32 Wash. Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 57, § 1.
3 Codified as RCW 6.16.010.
31 Copland v. Pirie, 26 Wash. 481, 67 Pac. 227 (1901) (specific exemptions section
amended not set forth in full as required by WASH. CONST. art. 2, § 37). Surprisingly,
the prohibition against claim of exemptions survived a similar attack. Creditors Col-
lection Ass'n v. Bisbee, 80 Wash. 358, 141 Pac. 886 (1914).3 5Verino v. Hickey, 135 Wash. 71, 237 Pac. 5 (1925).
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The original version of the present statute provided that exemptions
could be waived by written agreement. 8 In 1906 the Washington court
held that this provision defeated the constitutional provision requiring
that the legislature protect "a certain portion of the homestead and
other property of all heads of family" from forced sale"' in permitting
a binding executory contract to waive all exemptions. The court
subsequently held, however, that this constitutional provision did not
prevent the mortgaging of specific exempt property 9 and the spirit of
these two decisions was carried into the present waiver provision which
specifically permits the mortgaging of exempt property."
Despite the particularity of the section detailing mechanics of an
exemption claim," this section has provoked the most questions. Num-
erous decisions now chart a clear interpretation, suggesting the wisdom
of retaining this section in any proposed revision."
The first specific exemption of wages from garnishment was created
in 1893, covering all current wages or salary for personal services
earned within the preceding sixty days by one having a "family depend-
ent on him for support,""3 a requirement that has been retained through
subsequent amendments to the present statute."" In 1907 the proviso
was added that wages due or earned could not be claimed as exempt
under "in lieu" provisions of any statute.45 The present statute was
adopted in 1927, when the exemption was reduced to $20 per week.
38 Wash. Sess. Laws 1869, § 344, at 88.37 WASH. CONST. art. 19, § 1.
38 Slyfield v. Willard, 43 Wash. 179, 86 Pac. 392 (1906).
s" Cammarano v. Longmire, 99 Wash. 360, 169 Pac. 806 (1918).
40 RCW 6.16.080 (exemptions waived if not claimed "prior to sale under execution").
This section also makes exemptions inapplicable to nonresidents and persons who have
left or are about to leave the state with intent to defraud creditors.
41 RCW 6.16.090.
42The burden of asserting the exemptions is on the debtor. Zelinsky v. Price, 8
Wash. 256, 36 Pac. 28 (1894). But see RCW 6.16.020 (3) and (4). Absent demand
by the creditor within a "reasonable time" for an appraisement, the sheriff is under a
duty to return to the debtor property claimed exempt. Shell v. Svennson, 93 Wash. 40,
159 Pac. 1076 (1916) (twenty days more than reasonable time). However, even an
express waiver of appraisement does not preclude a challenge to the debtor's claimed
status. State ex rel. McKee v. McNeill, 58 Wash. 47, 107 Pac. 1028 (1910). Should
the sheriff ignore the exemption claim, the debtor may proceed by mandamus, State ex
rel. Hill v. Gardner, 32 Wash. 550, 73 Pac. 690 (1903), replevin, Mikkleson v. Parker,
3 Wash. Terr. 527, 19 Pac. 31 (1888), or by an order to show cause, at least if the
sheriff submits to the jurisdiction of the court, American Paper Co. v. Sullivan, 34
Wash. 391, 75 Pac. 991 (1904).
43 Wash. Sess. Laws 1893, ch. 56, § 23.
44RCW 7.32.280. In 1897, the amount of the exemption was reduced to $100. Wash.
Sess. Laws 1897, ch. 24, § 1. Under Wash. Sess. Laws 1901, ch. 139, § 1, the exemption
was limited to $10 a week for four consecutive weeks if the garnishment was founded
upon a debt for actual necessaries, an exception which remained until the most recent
amendment in 1927.
45 Wash. Sess. Laws 1907, ch. 210, § 1. It is this provision, retained in the present
version of the wage exemption statute which prevents claiming the $250 in lieu exemp-
19611
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An exemption of $250 of the savings of a member of a savings and
loan association was originally adopted in 1933.46 Unchanged sub-
stantively since that date, it has enjoyed relative obscurity as part of the
regulatory chapter covering savings and loan associations, unindexed as
an exemption.
REvISION IDEAS
Personal Property Exemptions-For Benefit of Family. Despite
the diversity of provisions among state exemptions for families, items
specifically exempted fall into a few well defined categories." The com-
mon basic provision is the selective exemption of household goods or
utensils or furniture, sometimes with a dollar limit, as in the Washington
statute,"8 or without limit save such as is inherent in the category label."
Use of the "household furniture" label frequently necessitated addi-
tional specific itemization of items not necessarily falling within that
term.5" South Dakota has avoided this necessity for repeated moderni-
tion of RCW 6.16.020 against wage garnishments, at least against superior court
garnishments. Cash may be claimed as exempt under the in lieu provision. Lemagie v.
Acme Stamp Co., 98 Wash. 34, 167 Pac. 60 (1917) and Dean v. Opdycke, 151 Wash.
504, 276 Pac. 545 (1929). In State ex rel. Seals v. Lewis, Superior Court for King
County No. 571588, Sept. 28, 1961, it was held that neither the $20 wage exemption nor
the prohibition against claiming the $250 in lieu exemption applies to justice court
garnishments. The decision is based on the absence of any provision in the present
wage exemption statute making it specifically applicable to justice court actions, a fea-
ture of the 1901 and 1907 amendments. But see 1958 OPs. WASH. ATT'Y GEN. 122
which, in arguing for a liberal construction of the wage exemption statute, does not
take into account the fact that a liberal construction would require that it be inapplicable
in justice court actions.
46 Wash. Sess. Laws 1933, ch. 183, § 91, now codified as RCW 33.20.140.
47 Following the Spanish civil code, almost every state, including Washington, spe-
cifically exempts wearing apparel and beds; a number exempt books of students, e.g.,
TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1955), many states having expanded the books to "private"
or family libraries, e.g., RCW 6.16.020(2), and items of religious significance, e.g.,
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 60, § 232 (one pew in meeting-house where debtor statedly
worships) and VA. CODE ANN. §34-26(1) (1953) (family Bible). The early agrarian
economy with its emphasis on self production produced additions of provisions for
family food supplies, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1955) which specifically itemizes
quantities of basic necessities and RCW 6.16.020(4), and for animals owned by most
householders, e.g., RCW 6.16.020(4).
48RCW 6.16.020(3) ($500) and MIss. CODE ANN. § 307 Ninth (r) (1956) ($1200).
49 CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-352 (1958) ("necessary ... bedding and household
furniture"). A few states attempted a specific delineation of the basic necessities of
family living, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-201 (1955).5 0 E.g., sewing machine, CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 52-35 (1958), musical instruments,
IOWA CODE ANN § 267.6(3) (1950), and spinning wheels, Ky. REV. STAT. § 427.010(1959). Legislatures which have continued to add to specific delineations with modern
items have added radios, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 690.2, and are currently adding televi-
sion sets, e.g. CAL. Civ. PROC. § 690.2 and Wis. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (5) (1958). An
as yet unconclusively settled question under the present Washington statute is whether
a television set may be claimed as exempt as household "furniture." An Attorney Gen-
eral's opinion says yes, relying on Black's definition of "furniture"-"whatever is
added to the interior of a house or apartment, for use or convenience." 1960 Ors.
WASH. ATT'Y. GEN. 170. At least one court has reached a contrary conclusion. Mi-
chaelson v. Eliott, 209 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1954) (applying a Minnesota statutory
ejusdem generis rule because of itemization preceding generic term).
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zation amendments by dividing its exemptions into two categories. The
"absolute" exemption consists of those derived from the Spanish civil
code plus one year's food and fuel.5 As an "additional" exemption, a
head of family may select $1500 of other personal property and a single
person, $600.52 The present Washington $250 in lieu householders'
exemption is an example of the value of a selective exemption in over-
coming the obsolescence of items specifically delineated."
There is another advantage of an additional selective exemption. The
generic term "household goods" does not encompass all "necessities"
for families. Perhaps the best example of an equivocal "necessity" is
the automobile."' Certainly it can be argued that for families living in
remote areas or in suburban areas not adequately serviced by public
transportation, an automobile is a necessity which should be exempted
within the objective of family protection. However, any definition of
those for whom an automobile is a necessity would leave much room for
dispute. Would not this result in such delay and burden on he courts
as to suggest that an automobile should be specifically exempted to all
families or that families for whom it is a necessity be permitted to claim
it under the type of selective provision suggested above?55
One provision of the present Washington statute seems worth retain-
ing:" the provision permitting either the husband or wife to select
exempt property. However, this permissive provision has created one
problem area worth considering in a revised version of the personal
property exemptions. An 1893 decision, Carter v. Davis," held that in
51 S.D. CODE § 51.1802 (1939).
52 S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 267, § 2. As an alternative to the "additional" exemption,
the debtor may choose, if the head of a family, a long list of itemized specifics (quite
antiquated) encompassing not only family but occupational exemptions. S.D. CODE §
51.1804 (1939).
53 RCW 6.16.020(4).
54 Only one state, California, specifically exempts an automobile for all debtors. CAL.
Civ., Paoc. § 690.24 (originally added in 1935, value limit raised to $250 in 1949). See
also HAWAI Rav. LAWS § 233-65 (c) (1955) (exempting "one vehicle belonging to any
person who is crippled or maimed").
55 There is an aspect of protection of creditor to this argument as well. If an article
regarded as a "necessity" by a family is seized for one creditor's benefit, the head of
the family will acquire a replacement if at all possible. When a replacement is acquired,
funds Will be diverted from existing creditors, or the family will have acquired another
debt, to the detriment of existing creditors.
56 The same might be said for the definition of "householder" contained in RCW
6.16.010. Its particularity has precluded all but one question: Is a man residing with
his illegitimate child a "householder," to which question the Washington court said,
"no." Peerless Pac. Co. v. F. Burckhard, 90 Wash. 221, 155 Pac. 1037 (1916). Quaere
whether this is a socially desirable conclusion. Is not an illegitimate child being raised
under such circumstances even more in need of the material comforts and appearances
of a "home" than a child being raised in a normal home? See OHIO REzv. COM ANN.
§ 2329.66 (Page Supp. 1961) which makes dependency the test.
57RCW 6.16.020(3) and (4).
58 6 Wash. 327, 33 Pac. 833 (1893).
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the absence of the husband, a wife has the privilege of selecting exempt
property only in a representative capacity for the husband. Thus, in
the Carter case, the husband having left the state with intent to defraud
creditors, the wife was without any right to claim exemptions. In 1897
the legislature adopted the present definition of "householder,"59 the
first section of which includes in the definition, "The husband and wife,
or either." Does this remove the wife's claim from the representative
category?6" Certainly the Carter decision is not consonant with the
basic purpose of the householder exemptions-protection of the family.
Because of the uncertainty which it engenders, it would seem wise to
settle the question specifically by a provision similar to that contained
in the Tennessee statute: "When a debtor absconds or leaves his family,
the exempted property shall be set apart for the use of the wife and
family, and shall be exempt in the hands of the wife or children...." 61
Personal Property Exemptions-For Benefit of Creditors. Most
states retain some type of occupational exemption. It is now generally
recognized that these exemptions should extend to single debtors as
well as to those having dependents.
6 2
Specific provisions still cling to the Spanish civil code occupational
classes: farmers, mechanics (tools of trade), professional, and mis-
cellaneous." True exemptions for farmers are found almost exclusively
in the midwestern and western states. They follow a fairly definite
pattern: named items without a dollar limit,6" plus a selective provision
59 RCW 6.16.010.
60 If not, was the Carter decision overruled sub silentio by State ex reL. Achey v.
Creech, 18 Wash. 186, 51 Pac. 363 (1897) ? Under the Achey decision a wife was per-
mitted to maintain an action for return of attached farming utensils and animals exempt
to householders. The court held, as an alternative ground, that she was entitled to
maintain the claim as an abandoned wife. The appellant (defendant below) had relied
on Carter. Brief for Appellant, p. 12. Respondent contended that Carter had no bearing
on the dispute. Brief for Respondent, p. 4. The court did not discuss appellant's conten-
tion that separation of the wife from the husband was part of a plan to defraud
creditors. Brief for Appellant, p. 8.6 1 TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-212 (1955).
62 E.g., despite the diversity of language used in the Washington exemptions for
specific occupational groups contained in RCW 6.16.020, the Washington court early
held that they were intended to extend to both family and individual income producers.
State ex rel. McKee v. McNeill, 58 Wash. 47, 107 Pac. 1028 (1910) (reading "for the
support of himself and family" as "or family" to permit single tailor to claim tools of
trade exemption). Note that the legislature had specifically amended subsection (12)
(teamster or drayman) to change "and family" to "or family," Wash. Sess. Laws 1886,
§ 1, at 96, but made no such change in the tools of trade section.
63 The miscellaneous group encompasses special occupations popular within the
state, e.g., Washington makes special provisions for lighterers, teamsters, and loggers.
RCW 6.16.020(11), (12) and (13). Virginia provides a $500 exemption for fishermen
or oystermen. VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (1953).
64 Usually the named items consist of transportation animals and vehicles, but a few
states have modernized these items by including a tractor, eg., MINN. STAT. ANN.
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for farming "utensils" with a dollar limit, 5 plus seed or crops, usually
with a dollar limit.66 More than a third of the states retain a tools of
trade exemption, a catchall for many occupations. Although a few
states, like Washington, have wide-open provisions, a dollar limit is
usually attached, ranging from $5067 to $500.68 Approximately one-
fourth of the states provide a special exemption for professional men.
A few exempt simply "professional libraries" without limit.69 Nebraska
exempts "libraries and implements" of professional men;7° a few
exempt the same with a dollar limit.71 Others, like Washington, have
singled out clergymen and attorneys as one classe' and physicians and
surgeons as another class." Only Vermont specifically includes den-
tists.",
Rather than attempting to categorize various occupations, several
states have adopted a collective definition covering all occupations.
Some use a dollar limit." Others use a wide-open provision, the only
limitation imposed being that of the word "necessary. 76
The foregoing discussion adequately illustrates the approaches which
can be used to identify what items shall be exempt. The vice of specific
item delineation is apparent if one simply refers to the Washington
teamster exemption: "One span of horses, or mules, or two yoke of
oxen" etc.77 Any specific delineation will ultimately become obsolete.
Even if the legislature is responsive in modernizing the items, the very
specificity is bound to cut out the necessary implements of some in-
come producer working in that occupation.
The second approach-a selective provision with dollar limit-solves
this problem in part. An example in the Washington statute is the pro-
§ 550.37 (Supp. 1960), or other modem farm implements, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. §
272.18(6) (Supp. 1960) (itemizing thirteen specific farm implements).
65 E.g., RCW 6.16.020(5) ($500). Other limits range from $50, Nu. REV. STAT.
§ 25-1556(6) (1943), to $4,000, C~A. Civ. PRoc. § 690.3 (1955).
66 RCW 6.16.020(5) itemizes specific seed. California provides for $1,000 of seed.
Cm. Civ. PRoc. § 690.3. North Dakota exempts crops raised on 160 acres. N.D.
CENT. CODE § 28-22-02 (1960).( 7 DE. CODE. ANN. tit. 10, § 4902(b) (1953).68 E .g., R. I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-26-4 (1956).69 E.g., CAL. Civ. PRoc. § 690.4.70Nm. Rxv. STAT. § 25-1556(6) (1943).
"1E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-22-04(4) (1960).
72 E.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2739 (1958).
73 E.g., MONT. REV. CODEs ANN. § 93-5814(3) (1947).
74 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2739 (1958).
75 E.g., ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.160(3) (1959).76E.g., LA. Ray. STAT. ANN. § 13.3881(2) (Supp. 1960): "The tools, instruments,
and books necessary to the exercise of a trade, calling, or profession by which he earns
his livelihood, in whole or in part."77 RCW 6.16.020(12).
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vision for attorneys and professional men: "... . also office furniture,
fuel and stationery not exceeding in value two hundred dollars in
coin." 8 This approach at least permits some flexibility as to coverage,
but it too has a shortcoming. While the $200 limit may have been a
reasonable amount in 1869 when it was attached, it would hardly
cover stationery supplies for an attorney today. One solution is to
attach a seemingly large dollar limit and hope that it will cover dollar
value fluctuations for an extended period. This solution, however,
means that debtors are actually going to have a substantial shield
against creditors during recession or depression. So, in trying to import
flexibility as to time, there is defeat of the basic purpose-protection
of creditors.
The final approach-the wide open approach--overcomes the objec-
tions to the first two but introduces its own problem. One variation
of the approach is the mechanics' exemption under the present Wash-
ington statute: "The tools and instruments used to carry on his
trade.""0 This exemption has served its purposes well for more than
70 years. It covers every modern development in tools and instruments
used to carry on any trade. It has an implicit limitation: if a debtor
tries to extend the exemption to questionable items, the creditor can
resort to the court to test the claim. The wide open approach has its
limitation when carried beyond the tools of trade exemption. Consider,
as an example, the 1959 amendment to the Missouri farmers' exemp-
tion: "all necessary farm implements."8 When, as in farming, the
possibilities as to what is "necessary" are increased, there is danger that
every attachment may necessitate a judicial determination of what is
"'necessary," increasing the burden on the courts and making the
attachment process so complex as to interfere with the rights of the
very creditors we are trying to protect. One solution is to attach a
dollar limit in order to reduce room for maneuvering by an astute
debtor. Because of the limitation imposed by the word "necessary,"
the dollar limit could be made large enough to be realistic far into the
future.
As indicated above, the usual approach to occupational exemptions
has been to identify occupational categories. This approach produces
particularly unwieldy results if carried to specific occupations, neces-
78 RCW 6.16.020 (8).
79 RCW 6.16.020 (6).
80 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 513.435 (Supp. 1960).
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sitating a determination as to who falls within the descriptive term.8
Should the fact that one's occupation does not fall within a descriptive
term require that an occupational exemption be denied? Even under
the broader categorization of farmers, mechanics, and professional
men there are gaps. There are many persons not on a payroll, requiring
specialized chattels to continue to produce an income, who are wholly
excluded. Additionally, if the definition of "mechanics" is expanded
too much to cover these gaps, there will be inevitable questions as to
whether a particular occupation falls within that or the "professional"
category.82 The collective definition eliminates these questions.
A final question which must be considered in connection with re-
vision of occupational exemptions is that which appears to evoke the
most consideration: should motor vehicles be specifically exempted?
Some courts have exempted motor vehicles through a liberal interpre-
tation of dated exemption statutes.8 " Other states, including Wash-
ington, have not been so fortunate in having language sufficiently
general to permit this result." A few legislatures have adopted specific
provisions. For example, the Wisconsin statute includes an exemption
of "any automobile used or kept for the purpose of carrying on the
debtor's trade or business."85
It would seem that if an automobile or truck is necessary for a
debtor's continued production of income, it should be exempted, within
limits, either specifically or within a realistic selective provision. If a
wage earner must have an automobile to get to and from his work,
then, again, perhaps an automobile should be exempt for him, to attain
the objective of keeping him producing income."
81 E.g., Grimm v. Naugle, 34 Wn2d 75, 208 P.2d 123 (1949) (one who engages in
hauling logs for others-even though not currently licensed-is engaged in the "busi-
ness of logging") and In re Rash, 81 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Wash. 1948) (is one who
has built up an individual hauling business to a large motor freight company of which
he is an executive a "teamster or drayman"?).82 E.g., it has been held that a dentist is entitled to claim his tools as exempt, as a
mechanic, Maxon v. Perott, 17 Mich. 332 (1868), yet is a dentist not more appro-
priately identified as a professional man?8 3 E.g., Kelly v. Degelau, 244 Iowa 873, 58 N.W.2d 374 (1953) ("vehicle... by the
use of which he habitually earns his living") and Dowd v. Henson, 122 Kans. 278, 252
Pac. 260 (1927) ("necessary tools and implements").84 I re Rash, 81 F. Supp. 389 (W.D. Wash. 1948).85Wis. STAT. AwN. § 272.18(6) (Supp. 1960). The Oregon statute specifically
provides that, as used in the occupational exemption section "vehicle" includes a truck,
trailer or motor vehicle. ORE. REv. STAT. § 23.160(3) (1959). Quaere the value of
this special provision when the overall occupational exemption is only $400. Other
provisions: IDAHO CoDn ANx. § 11-205(3) and (4) ($200 motor vehicle for farmers
and artisans) and NEv. Rnv. STAT. § 21.090(f) (1959) (no value limit on motor
vehicle for drayman, hackman, teamster, etc., but $1,000 limit on motor car for
physicians, surgeons, constables and ministers).86 Julius v. Druckrey, 214 Wisc. 643, 254 N.W. 358 (1934) (debtor-employee who
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Personal Property Exemptions-For Benefit of Single Debtors.
Apart from occupational exemptions, the present Washington statute
exempts only wearing apparel, private libraries to $500, and family
keepsakes for single debtors." While an aspect of creditor protection
may be suggested,88 more liberal provisions are justified on the basis of
social interest. Some states have made special provision only for the
aged,89 widows,9° or women.91 Other states have extended a special
exemption to all single persons.92
Wage Exemptions. While personal property exemptions have re-
mained relatively static, wage exemptions in other states have been
tailored to meet almost every type of eventuality. Few remain at the
niggardly $20 per week level of the Washington statute. By contrast,
exemptions of neighboring states seem exceedingly liberal: Montana, all
wages earned within a period of 45 days preceding garnishment for
heads of families and single persons over age 60;"4 Oregon, $175 per
month for heads of families,99 and California, one-half the earnings of
all debtors, all if necessary for the use of the debtor's family.9"
Rather than a flat rate or percentage exemption, a few states use a
percentage with a minimum, maximum," or both." Escalator pro-
visions are used to provide for the greater needs of larger families." 0
Under the New Jersey statute, 90% of wages are exempt, but courts
lived one-half mile from place of employment might be entitled to claim $400 automo-
bile as exempt "for the purpose of carrying on the debtor's trade or business").
87RCW 6.16.020(1) and (2).
88 See note 55 supra.
89 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-5816 and 33-125 (1947).90 E.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-5-1 (1953).
91 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT. § 665-a.
92 S.D. Sess. Laws 1957, ch. 267, § 2.
93 RCW 7.32.280. The New Hampshire exemption is only $20 per week, but it ex-
tends to all wage earners. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 512.21(11) (1955). In addition,
earnings of wives and minor children are wholly exempt. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
512.21 (III) (1955). Maine's exemption is only $30 per month. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
ch. 12, § 67 (1954). West Virginia's exemption appears to be only $10, but only 20%
of wages are subject to a continuing lien on execution. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3834(3)(1955). And see TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-207 (1955) ($60 per month for head of family
plus $5 for each child under 16, $30 for others).
94 MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 93-5816 and 33-125 (1947).
95 ORE. REV. STAT. § 23.180 (1959).
96 CAL. CIrv. PROC. § 690.11.
97 E.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 46-208 (Supp. 1958).98 E.g., IDAIHO CODE ANN. § 11-205(7) (1953) (75% of earnings, $100 maximum).99 E.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 34-29 (Supp. 1960) (75% with a minimum of $50 and
maximum of $75 for nonhouseholders and $100 minimum and $150 maximum for house-
holders).
100 E.g., WIs. STAT. ANN. § 272.18(15) (a) and (b) (1958) (60% with a minimum
of $100 and maximum of $120 per month plus $20 for each dependent, up to 85% of
wages), and IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (Supp. 1960) ($35 per week for head of family
plus $3 per week for each dependent under age 18). The Iowa wage exemption statute,
amended in 1957, is critcized in Note, 43 IOWA L. REV. 555 (1958).
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have discretion to release exempt wages if the debtor's earnings are
more than $2500 per year.'' Under the New York statute only 10%
of wages are subject to garnishment, and only after judgment. An
execution on judgment then becomes a lien on the non-exempt portion
until paid in full.1 2
A flat amount exemption has the obvious disadvantage of being
almost always out of step with dollar value fluctuations. Of course,
if the legislature is responsive, this is not an unsurmountable objection.
Massachusetts, for example, uses a flat amount exemption. In 1947
it was increased from $20 to $25 per week; in 1951, to $30; in 1956 to
$40, and in 1959, to $50 per week.'
The percentage exemption, on the other hand, has timeless utility.
It gives recognition to the fact that families have different standards of
living, fixed to a large degree by the size of the wages of the head of
the family. It is better than the flat amount exemption from the
creditor's viewpoint because it assures that some portion of the wage
earner's salary will always be subject to garnishment. It has the
obvious disadvantage of exempting too little for those with small
incomes and too much for large income producers. Additionally, if the
percentage is set too high, a wage earner will be subject to repeated
garnishments by the same creditor, endangering his job while produc-
ing only negligible amounts for the creditor. These disadvantages are
largely overcome by the use of minimum and maximum limitations,
but these additions, unless very liberal, build in the very rigidity which
the percentage exemption is supposed to avoid.
Escalator provisions seem the most practical means of recognizing
the greater needs of larger families. An area of discretion for the
courts, such as that under the New Jersey statute, is another way to
permit recognition of individual needs, but if the area of discretion
were too large, the burden cast on the courts could be staggering 0 4
1o1 NJ. REv. STAT. § 2A-17-56 (1951).
102 N.Y. Cv. pAc. Ac . § 684. See also CoNx. GEN. STAT. REv. § 52-361 (1958),
under which a judgment may become a continuing lien on wages in excess of $25, but
the debtor may apply for modification.203 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 246, § 28 (Supp. 1960).
104 One area in which court discretion might well be considered is that of garnish-
ments for child support obligations. Although the Washington court has not directly
so held, it is probable that the present wage exemption can be claimed against such
garnishments. In Stafford v. Stafford, 18 Wn.2d 775, 140 P.2d 545 (1943), it was held
that homestead property is exempt from execution sale on an alimony and child support
decree. The material language of the present wage exemption statute is as command-
ing as that of the homestead exemption statute, RCW 6.12.090. Courts might be given
the same power to allocate a portion of the exempt wages of a father to child support
as they have assumed to allocate a portion of the wages of a new community to a child
1961]
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The continuing lien feature of the New York statute is of particular
interest if exempted amounts are substantial. It eliminates the neces-
sity for repeated garnishments which might endanger a debtor's job.
On the other hand, such a provision puts a premium on early suit and
garnishment.
Approximately 60% of the states today make some provision for
single debtors. In many instances, the exemption is the same for all
wage earners.'0 5 More frequently, however, a smaller amount is pro-
vided for single persons."° Since the result of a wage exemption is
usually only to delay collection of larger amounts-for example, to re-
quire two garnishments rather than one-there seems to be no valid
argument against at least a subsistence exemption for single persons.
Under the present Washington statute, the mechanics of claiming
the exemption are not specified. The usual procedure is submission by
the wage earner of an affidavit as to his status as head of a family. The
delay entailed frequently leaves the wage earner without current funds
for a period of a day to several days. Recognizing the resulting hard-
ship, many states have adopted provisions which make the exempt
amount automatically payable.0 7
The form of an automatic exemption is to a degree dependent upon
the manner in which the exempt amount is determined.0 The Wiscon-
sin statute, which uses a complex percentage with minimum and maxi-
mum and escalator provision, permits payment of a subsistence allow-
ance of $15 to an individual or $25 to an individual with dependents,
not to exceed 50% of amounts owing." 9 Virginia has attempted to
support obligation of a former marriage of the husband. Fisch v. Marler, 12 Wn.2d
698, 97 P.2d 147 (1939). See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 26-210 (1955).
105 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 630 (Supp. 1957) (75% of wages for all wage earners).
106 E.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. § 690.11 (50% for all persons, 100% for head of family on
proof of necessity).
107 Hardship cases have produced other specialized provisions, e.g., KAN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 60-3495 (1949) (exempting for six months wages of debtor who has been sick
for in excess of two weeks, upon proof of this fact by testimony of physician) ; MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 550.37 (Supp. 1960) (exempting wages of person who has been a wel-
fare recipient for six months following return to employment), and R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. § 9-26-4(12) (b) (1956) (same, for one year). The latter two provisions are
particularly worth considering in connection with the situation of a deserted mother
trying to support her children without aid from their father. She may obtain employ-
ment after having received Aid to Dependent Children funds. A series of garnish-
ments may result in loss of her job and force her back on the ADC rolls.
108 Under statutes providing the same exemption for single persons and householders
there is no problem, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. § 690.11 ("One-half of the earnings of the
defendant... shall be exempt from execution or attachment without filing a claim for
exemption...") and IOWA CODE ANN. § 627.10 (Supp. 1960) ("Every employer shall
pay to such employee such exempt wages or salary or commission or profit allowances
...upon such employee's making and delivering to his employer, his affidavit that he is
such head of family.") The Iowa statute is criticized in Note, 43 IOWA L. REV. (1958).
109 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 272.18 (15) (e) (1) (1958). If the court subsequently deter-
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solve the problem of providing an automatic exemption under an ex-
emption of a percentage with minimum and maximum, varying for
householders and nonhouseholders, by providing that the employer may
rely on the employee's withholding exemption certificate filed for in-
come tax purposes. Any person showing more than one exemption on
the certificate is considered to be a householder or head of a family.10
One possible additional salutory result of provision for automatic
exemption is that it might relieve a part of the burden thrown on em-
ployers by employee garnishments. Part of this burden is the confusion
and time loss incident to garnishment, caused by the employee's efforts
to secure an immediate release of his check or to effect release of the
exempt portion. Since one of the major problems in the garnishment
area is the discharge policy which most employers must maintain as a
result of the garnishment burden, this result is particularly to be
sought. Any automatic exemption provision should be designed with
this possibility in mind.
PROPOSED REvISIONS IN THE WASHINGTON LEGISLATURE
Since 1945 more than two dozen bills have been introduced in the
two branches of the Washington legislature, amending either or both
the personal property exemptions and wage exemption. Most have in-
corporated one or more of the better features of the statutes of other
states."' All have contained substantial increases in some value lim-
its."2 During each session, with one exception, at least one of these
mines that the subsistence amount was less than the exemption to which the wage
earner was entitled, the additional amount is paid over to him.
110 The objection to such a provision is that it forces the employer to make a judicial
determination. An additional objection is that a withholding certificate does not always
reflect the true circumstances of a taxpayer since exemptions may be claimed to which
he is not entitled.
"I' E.g., S.B. 268 (1961), prepared and introduced on behalf of the Legislative Com-
mittee of the Washington State Bar Association, exempted an automobile to $500 for
single persons and householders and provided a $500 selective exemption for both
single persons and householders in addition to a $1,500 household goods exemption for
householders. The Legislative Committee has recommended that this bill be introduced
again in the 1963 legislature. 15 WAsH. S.B. NEWs 20 (1961). Surprisingly, some
bills have included more restrictive provisions than present statutes, e.g., S.B. 97 (1961)
deleted all provisions for farmers and H.B. 528. (1951) restricted a $1,000 selective
occupational exemption to householders.
112 None of the personal property exemption bills have raised all values to present
dollar values of the 1886 limits. As examples of such a conversion, the household goods
exemption would become $1500; the in lieu exemption, $800; farm utensils, $1500, and
attorneys' libraries, $3100, and supplies, $600. (Values are rounded to the nearest
$100.) Conversions are based upon the following comparative purchasing values of the
dollar, the base period 1935-39 being equal to $1.00: 1886 = $1.45; 1927 = $0.85; June
1961 = $0.469. Banking, Sept. 1958, p. 54.
Wage exemptions, on the other hand, have been proposed in excess of the $36 con-
vetted value of the present exemption, e.g., three of the wage exemption bills introduced
in the 1961 legislature provided three different formulae: H.B. 150 (automatic exemp-
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bills has been passed by one branch of the legislature,"' only to be lost
in the shuffle in the other branch.
Ideally, exemption statutes should be the product of compromises
among interested groups, and most of the bills which have been intro-
duced in the Washington legislature have reflected an attempt to effect
such compromises. However, after a review of the Washington legis-
lative record in connection with proposed debtor exemption revisions,
one ceases to think in terms of the ideal and to think only that change
-any change-is to be sought. It is to be hoped that the revision
which must ultimately come will not be a product of such frustration
but, rather, will reflect an attempt to deal with a difficult area intelli-
gently and with consideration for the interests of all.
tion, 25% for single person, 75% for householder), H.B. 32 ($20 for single person, $40
for householder), and S.B. 269 ($20 for single person, $35 for couple plus $5 for each
dependent).
113 1945: S.B. 277 (wage exemption) passed Senate, 41 in favor, 0 opposed, 5 not
voting. 1945 H. JouR. 548.
1947: S.B. 146 (personal property and wage exemptions) passed Senate, 42-0-4.
1947 S. JoUR. 183.
1951: H.B. 528 (personal property exemptions) passed House, 74-18-7. 1951 H.
JOUR. 613. H.B. 119 (wage exemption) passed House 75-16-8. 1951 H. JOUR. 608.
1953: H.B. 58 (wage exemption) passed House, 86-10-3. 1953 H. JOUR. 116.
1955: H.B. 378 (wage exemption) passed House, 79-11-9. 1955 H. JOUR. 444.
1957: H.B. 107 (wage exemption) passed House, 82-8-9. 1957 H. JOUR. 357. H.B.
92 (personal property exemptions) passed House, 70-17-2. 1957 H. JOUR. 780.
1959: H.B. 505 (wage exemption) passed House, 83-13-3. 1959 H. JOUR. 461. H.B.
222 (personal property exemptions) passed House 96-0-3. 1959 H. JOUR. 294.
1961: H.B. 150 (wage exemption) passed House, 85-5-9. 1961 LEG. REC. 137.
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